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Political Questions and Political Remediesby Jonathan R. Siegel
Professor of LawGeorge Washington University Law School
Political Questions and Political Remediesby Jonathan R. SiegelAbstractDefenders of the political question doctrine sometimes observe that the lackof a judicial remedy for a constitutional violation does not deprive injured partiesof all remedy, because injured parties can pursue a political or an electoralremedy—they can seek relief “at the ballot box” or in the political process.  Thisessay criticizes that argument.Political and electoral remedies for constitutional violations are ineffectivefor important practical and theoretical reasons that grow out of the differentstructures of the judicial, political, and electoral processes.  The judicial processfocuses each case on a particular issue; candidates in elections always represent apackage of positions on many issues, so that voters do not actually have anopportunity to vote for or against a particular, allegedly unconstitutional action.The judicial process produces reasons for its decisions; the electoral processproduces only an inscrutable result, so that even if voters managed to defeat acandidate because of unconstitutional action, no one could really know it.  Thejudicial process operates within a system of precedent; political battles may have tobe fought afresh each election cycle.  The judicial process is mandatory; legislaturesmay choose to ignore political agitation.  Finally, the judicial process operatesaccording to law; the political and electoral processes are majoritarian and are notlikely to be good vehicles for enforcing constraints on majoritarianism.These differences between the judicial, political, and electoral processesdemonstrate the error of arguing that the political and electoral processes providean adequate substitute for a judicial remedy. They also show that the politicalinsulation of judges, although very important, is only one factor supporting theinstitution of judicial review.  Judicial review also rests on the distinctive featuresof the judicial process:  that it is focused, that it is mandatory, that it articulatesnorms explicitly, and that it operates within a system of precedent.  Defenders of thepolitical question doctrine must explain not only why we should entrustconstitutional questions to officials not insulated from politics, but why we shouldentrust them to a process lacking these other, vital features of judicial review.
* Professo r of Law, G eorge W ashington U niversity Law Sc hool.
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)(“The p owers of the legislature are defined and limited; andthat those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.”).
2 J. Peter M ulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 156-62 (1988 ).
3 Rachel B arkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 329 (2002).
Political Questions and Political Remediesby Jonathan R. Siegel*
The puzzling and troubling feature of the political question doctrine is the potential it seemsto have to render constitutional provisions meaningless.  After armed struggle and tremendouspolitical effort, our ancestors gave us the magnificent achievement of a written Constitution thatlimits the powers of government.1  Under the political question doctrine, however, the principalenforcement mechanism for those constitutional limits—judicial review—is not available for certainconstitutional provisions.  At least at first blush, therefore, it might appear that some parts of theConstitution, though ostensibly constraining the behavior of government, cannot in fact do so,because of the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the constraint.Defenders of the political question doctrine explain this apparently troubling fact innumerous ways.  They point out that the lack of judicial enforcement does not automatically rendera constitutional constraint meaningless.  The political branches may successfully police themselvesby obeying judicially unenforceable constitutional provisions.2  Indeed, some scholars argue, thepolitical branches may have institutional advantages that make them better suited to apply certainconstitutional provisions than the judiciary.3The main purpose of this essay is to critique one further argument used by defenders of the
4 See infra Part II. - 2 -
political question doctrine:  that, even where a constitutional provision is not judicially enforceable,it is still susceptible of electoral enforcement.  When voters, this argument runs, have no judicialremedy for a perceived constitutional violation because of the political question doctrine, they canstill take to the polls and turn offending politicians out of office.  Thus, this argument suggests, weshould not be overly concerned that the political question doctrine deprives the courts of enforcementpower over certain constitutional provisions, because the electoral process provides an appropriatesubstitute.4This essay calls attention to the flaws in this argument.  The argument ignores criticaldifferences between the judicial and the electoral processes.  Not only might attempts to use theelectoral process to remedy constitutional violations be utterly impractical because of the cost andeffort required, but the electoral process lacks crucial structural elements provided by the judicialprocess that make the latter a proper mechanism for the enforcement of constitutional constraints.The judicial process is mandatory in nature; it focuses on particular issues; it provides a statementof reasons for its decisions; it operates within a system of precedent; and it operates according to law,not according to majoritarian preference.  These features of the judicial process, this essay argues,are not found in the electoral process and are crucial to the appropriateness of the judicial processfor resolving constitutional issues.The primary, and modest, purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the flaws in this one,particular argument used in defense of the political question doctrine.  But beyond that, the essaysuggests that analyzing the flaws in the argument is of interest because it provides useful insight intothe issue of the political question doctrine’s ultimate validity.  In cataloging the differences between
- 3 -
the judicial and electoral processes, we see some of the important reasons why the judicial processis so well suited to serving as the enforcement mechanism for constitutional constraints.  It is notjust, as is often noted, that the judicial process is insulated from politics because of the life tenureof federal judges.  The other characteristics of the judicial process that distinguish it from theelectoral process also play a vital role in rendering constitutional provisions meaningful.  Defendersof the political question doctrine must explain why we should entrust our Constitution’s enforcementto processes that lack these characteristics.Part I of this essay prepares the ground for this argument by discussing what the politicalquestion doctrine actually is and, in particular, by rehearsing the well-known point of Professor LouisHenkin that the term “political question doctrine” should not be used when referring to cases inwhich a court merely holds that a challenged governmental action is not subject to legal constraint.The essence of the doctrine is that it may bar judicial enforcement of actual legal constraints ongovernment behavior.  Part II then puts forward the main argument:  the electoral process cannotprovide an appropriate substitute for judicial enforcement of constitutional constraints, because itlacks characteristics of the judicial process that are essential to the task of enforcing such constraints.In cataloging these characteristics, we see why the judicial process is so well suited to that task andwhy any doctrine that takes that task away from it bears an especially heavy burden of justification.I.  HOORAY FOR HENKINIn coming to a view about the political question doctrine, one must begin by understandingwhat the doctrine actually is. Unfortunately, usage reveals that the doctrine has two quite differentmeanings.  One of these, which I shall call the real political question doctrine, provides that, in somecircumstances, the federal courts cannot enforce legal constraints on government action, even when
5 Louis He nkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597, 622 (1976).
6 U.S. Const., amend. XVI. - 4 -
the occasion for such enforcement arises in what, but for the political question doctrine, would bea proper Article III case or controversy.  The other, which may be called the bogus political questiondoctrine, merely expresses the point that a plaintiff who challenges government action that is notsubject to legal constraint must necessarily lose.  This observation is, of course, nothing new.  In his justly famous 1976 article, Is There aPolitical Question Doctrine?, Louis Henkin pointed out that, in many cases, the political questiondoctrine serves no real function, but only provides a confusing and deceptive packaging of obviousprinciples such as that “[t]he courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branches withintheir constitutional authority,” and that “[t]he courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on thepowers of the political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any.”5  Readers of thepresent volume will probably be well versed in this basic point, articulated by Henkin nearly thirtyyears ago.  Nonetheless, I do not ask the reader’s pardon for taking a few pages to drive the pointhome, because the cases and the scholarly literature show that Henkin’s point is stillunderappreciated, and because my main line of argument requires a clear understanding of what thereal political question doctrine actually does.  A.  The Bogus Political Question DoctrineImagine that a taxpayer brought a lawsuit in federal court asserting that income tax rates arejust too high and asking the court to order that they be reduced.  Such a lawsuit would of coursedeserve immediate dismissal.  The Constitution gives Congress the power to tax incomes6 andimposes no constraint that would prevent Congress from imposing the current set of income tax
7 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(6) (perm itting dismissal of a p laintiff’s complaint fo r “failure to state a cla im uponwhich relief can be granted”).
8 Cf. Jonathan R . Siegel, Suing the President:  Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1612, 1649(1997) (noting that, in their d esire to win cases, government lawyers may urge courts to stretch jurisdictional doctrinesto cover case s to which they sh ould not re ally apply); Ke nneth Culp D avis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending- 5 -
rates.  Plaintiff would have failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.A funny thing could happen, however, on the way to dismissing the plaintiff’s frivolous case.Instead of simply pointing out that the plaintiff has not stated any legal reason why Congress isrequired to lower tax rates and therefore dismissing under Federal Rule 12(b)(6),7 the court mightinvoke the political question doctrine.  The court might remark that the choice of tax rates is“committed to the political process for resolution” and dismiss for lack of Article III jurisdiction. Invocation of the political question doctrine in such a case would perhaps be harmless—itwould not much matter precisely which label the court put on dismissal of such an obviouslyfrivolous case—but it would surely be pointless.  As Henkin observed long ago, we do not need anebulous “doctrine” to tell us that when a plaintiff challenges a government action that is not subjectto legal constraint, the plaintiff loses.  Common sense and Rule 12(b)(6) tell us that.  To the extentthe doctrine calls for dismissal of cases because defendants’ actions are legally unconstrained, it doesno work at all.Moreover, the principle of Occam’s razor, applied to legal thinking, would warn us to avoidmultiplying doctrines needlessly.  Invocation of the political question doctrine where it serves nopurpose is at least potentially dangerous.  Because doctrines ought to do something, not nothing,courts are likely to imagine that the political question doctrine must do more than merely duplicatethe concept of dismissal for failure to state a claim; they may struggle to give it content, and it maygive government lawyers a weapon to dismiss lawsuits that courts should hear.8  Courts should
to Sue an Officer, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 438-42 (1962) (same).
9 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996 ).
10 Id. at 465-66.  The case was one of a spate of similar cases brought by several states at the time.
11 Id. at 467. - 6 -
therefore avoid the doctrine in cases in which it serves no function.  All of this would be too obvious to be worth pointing out if some cases and scholarly articlesdid not still, almost thirty years after Henkin, use the political question doctrine to express the pointthat a plaintiff must lose when there is simply no legal constraint on the government action thatplaintiff challenges (or when the plaintiff, at least, points to no applicable legal constraint).  TheThird Circuit’s decision in New Jersey v. United States provides an excellent, recent example of suchpointless, or bogus, invocation of the political question doctrine.9  The state of New Jersey allegedthat the federal government’s failure to enforce the immigration laws imposed unconstitutional costson the state by compelling it to expend funds to educate illegal alien children and prosecute illegalaliens who commit crimes.10  The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the complaint.The court’s opinion was, however, curious:  first it found the state’s claims to be meritless,but then it held them to be political questions.  For example, the court said that “there is no basis fora claim that the Constitution has been violated by the federal government’s inaction, which allegedlyhas set in motion events that have indirectly caused the state to incur costs.”11  That is, the courtexplained why the state’s claim failed on its merits:  there is simply no legal requirement that thefederal government implement the immigration laws so as to avoid imposing costs on states.  Havingsaid that, however, the court held the claim to be a nonjusticiable political question.  Invoking the
12 369 U.S. 186, 217 (19 62).
13 91 F.3d at 470.
14 No one doubts that courts may he ar constitutiona l challenges to  immigration and naturalization laws whena plaintiff points to a legal constraint that at least might be applicable to them, such as the constraint arising from theEqual Protection Clause.   See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (upholding naturalization laws against anEqual Protection challenge).  Here, the real problem was not that the judiciary may never consider attacks on theimmigration laws, but that the p laintiff state had not specified any legal constraint on Congress’s ability to pass such lawsthat could even conceivably have formed the basis of such an attack.
15 263 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2001). - 7 -
well-known list of political question factors given by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,12 the courtheld that the Constitution commits immigration to the political branches of government, that therewould be no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issues the casepresented, and that resolving the issues would express a lack of respect for a coordinate branch.13 The case presents a particularly clear example of a court’s invoking the political questiondoctrine when it really means to say that the plaintiff’s claims failed on their merits.  The court allbut held that the claims were political questions precisely because they failed on their merits.14  Thecourt determined that the issues presented were committed to the political branches because itdetermined that the Constitution does not constrain the enforcement discretion of the politicalbranches with regard to immigration matters.  It seem particularly egregious to say that a courtcannot interpret the Constitution and resolve the claims presented by a plaintiff when the court hasjust finished doing exactly that.A similar example of bogus invocation of the political question doctrine occurred in theTenth Circuit’s decision in Schroder v. Bush,15 a case rather like the income tax hypothetical posedabove.  The plaintiffs in Schroder were farmers suffering from difficult economic conditions.  Theysought an order requiring the President, cabinet Secretaries, and the United States itself to “control
16 Id. at 1172.
17 Id. at 1173 (internal quotation omitted).  As if that were not enough, plaintiffs also asked the court to declarethat “sub-par agricultural commodity prices shall be allowed as an affirmative defense in any action for debt.”  Id.
18 263 F.3d at 1174.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995 ) (holding that Congress exceeded its powers under theCommerce Clause); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holdingprovisions of the bankruptcy laws unconstitutional); Richardson v. Sullivan, 996 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1993) (Table, textin Westlaw) (holding that Congress did not violate the Constitution by taking the dollar off the gold standard).- 8 -
United States currency and to maintain market conditions so as to be favorable to small farmers.”16They also asked the court to order the U.S. Trade Representative to “cooperate in negotiating andimplementing foreign trade agreements that would benefit small farmers.”17Needless to say, the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of this frivolous complaint.  Butrather than simply observe that plaintiffs had stated no reason why federal economic, farm, andinternational trade policy was unlawful, the court invoked the political question doctrine.  Referringto the Baker v. Carr factors, the court determined that the case “presents textbook examples ofpolitical questions.”18  The court’s analysis was, however, more confusing than helpful.  The court observed thatthe Constitution commits the regulation of commerce, the establishment of bankruptcy law, and theregulation of currency to Congress.19   That is certainly true, but it has little to do with the reason thecase was properly dismissed.  Congress’s regulation of commerce, bankruptcy, and currency comesbefore the courts all the time; courts regularly pass on whether Congress has exceeded the limits ofits power in these areas.20  The problem was not that regulation of these issues is unreviewablycommitted to Congress, but that the plaintiffs had not stated any basis for review; they had not statedany reason why Congress’s actions were unlawful.  
21 263 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S . at 217). 
22 Robert Pushaw, Judicial Review and the Political Q uestion Do ctrine:  Revivin g the Fede ralist “Rebuttab lePresumption” Analysis, 80 N. Car. L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (2002).
23 Id. at 1167-68.
24 Id. at 1196-97. - 9 -
The court also said that the plaintiffs’ requested relief would require “‘initial policydeterminations’ in an area devoid of ‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards’ and where‘multifarious pronouncements by various departments’ would lead to confusion and disaster.”21  Thiswas somewhat more to the point, but was merely a long-winded way of saying, once again, thatplaintiffs had not alleged the violation of any legal constraint on federal economic policy.  Thecourt’s political question analysis added nothing to its decision and could provide dangerousammunition for some future government lawyer to use in trying to get a court to dismiss a properchallenge to federal farm policy.Pointless invocation of the political question doctrine may also be observed in the scholarlyliterature.  In a recent symposium about Baker v. Carr, for example, Robert Pushaw takes theSupreme Court to task for adopting a “cavalier attitude” under which “the political question doctrinehas ceased to function as a meaningful jurisdictional restraint.”22  Professor Pushaw laments theimpact of Baker and recommends reinstating the “Federalist approach” to political questions, underwhich, he says, constitutional provisions can rebut the presumption favoring judicial review.23  Indescribing what questions would actually be political questions under such a Federalist approach,however, Professor Pushaw observes that the doctrine would apply where the people have “entrustedtheir federal government representatives with complete latitude” and where, “by definition theexercise of such discretion cannot violate the Constitution.”24  Thus, for example, Professor Pushaw
25 Id. at 1197. - 10 -
observes that, under his view, no court could hear a claim against the President’s decision to vetoa bill passed by the Congress, because even though vetoes are occasionally misguided, thePresident’s discretion with regard to the veto power is absolute.25Such a formulation provides that the political question doctrine should apply precisely whereit serves no purpose.  We need no special jurisprudential doctrine to get rid of lawsuits challengingpresidential vetoes as misguided.  Such a challenge to a veto must fail on its merits, because, asProfessor Pushaw observes, the President has plenary authority to veto any bill.Once for all, courts and scholars should internalize Henkin’s insight and cease invoking thepolitical question doctrine for cases in which a court, having examined the relevant legal sources,concludes that there is no applicable legal constraint on the action that the plaintiff is challenging.The very fact that the court has reached that conclusion proves that the matter is not beyond judicialcognizance.  The court has simply concluded, in the perfectly ordinary way, that the plaintiff has notstated a claim upon which relief can be granted.B.  The Real Political Question DoctrineIt would be equally wrong, however, to carry Henkin’s insight too far.  Courts sometimesinvoke the political question doctrine in cases in which they merely hold, in the ordinary way, thatdefendant’s actions are not unlawful, but that does not mean that they invoke the doctrine only insuch cases.  There really are cases in which a court dismisses the plaintiff’s claim, not because thedefendant’s action is subject to no legal constraint, but because the court concludes (rightly orwrongly) that the legal constraint applicable to the defendant’s actions is not judicially enforceable.Perhaps the best example of such a case—a case that very usefully illustrates the difference between
26 801 F.2d 445 (D .C. Cir. 1986).
27 U.S. Const., art. 1, § 2.
28 U.S. Const., amend. XVII.
29 U.S. Const., art. I, § 5, cl. 1. - 11 -
bogus and real political question cases—is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Morgan v. United States.26The case concerned an extremely close election for a seat in the House of Representativesin 1984.   The Secretary of State of Indiana certified that the Republican candidate had won by asmall margin. After making its own inquiry, however, a House committee concluded that theDemocratic candidate had defeated the Republican by just four votes.  By a party-line vote, theHouse seated the Democrat.  A group of Republicans brought suit seeking an injunction requiringthe seating of the Republican candidate.There can be no doubt that when either house of Congress investigates a contested electionand decides which candidate to seat, its action is subject to legal constraint.  The house must seat thecandidate who received more lawful votes.  This requirement follows from the constitutionalprovisions that the House of Representatives “shall be composed of members chosen every secondyear by the people of the several states,”27 and that the Senate “shall be composed of two Senatorsfrom each state, elected by the people thereof.”28  For either house to seat as a Member a candidatewho actually lost the election would surely be unlawful, indeed, unconstitutional. Nonetheless, when the Morgan case reached the D.C. Circuit, that court summarily held thatit lacked jurisdiction.  Then-Judge Scalia observed that the Constitution provides that “[e]ach Houseshall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”29  Thecommand that each house shall not only judge its own elections, but shall be “the Judge” of them,
30 801 F.2d at 447.  Judge Scalia also relied on the history of the Elections Clause, which in his view, was“entirely consistent with its plain exclusion of judicial jurisdiction.”  Id. 
31 Curiously, Judge Scalia, after citing the Elections Clause, concluded that “without need to rely upon theamorphous and partly p rudential do ctrine of ‘politica l questions,’ .  . . we simply lack ju risdiction to p roceed.”  801 F.2dat 447.  I am not sure  why, in this unusual case actually involving the political question doctrine, Judge Scalia concludedthat the doctrine was not involved!
32 Henkin notes that, even where government action is subject to legal constra int and violate s that constraint,ordinary principles of equity may cause a court to deny injunctive relief.  He regards some political question cases asbeing explainab le on that grou nd.  Henk in, supra  note ___ , at 617-22 .  I cannot prove that o rdinary princ iples of equitycould  not have explained the Morgan case, but it seems unlikely that equity would demand that a court tolerate thepossibility that the lo sing candid ate is holding a  seat in Congr ess.  Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U .S. 486 (1969).
33 Wayne  McCo rmack, The Political Question Doctrine —Jur ispruden tially, 70 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 793, 795(1993); see also  Wayne  McCo rmack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 595, 614,623 (1987).  Professor McCormack also says that the result of calling an issue a political question is that “there are notand never could be any judicially-enforceab le constraints” on the action— a different, and  tautologically true , statement.- 12 -
Judge Scalia determined, excluded anyone else, including federal judges, from judging suchelections.  “It is difficult,” he said, “to imagine a clearer case of ‘textually demonstrableconstitutional commitment’ of an issue to another branch of government to the exclusion of thecourts.”30This case, then, illustrates the real political question doctrine:  the challenged action wasundoubtedly subject to legal constraint, but the court dismissed the case on the ground that the legalconstraint was not judicially enforceable.31  Notice the difference from bogus political question cases.In this case, assuming the facts stated in plaintiff’s complaint to be true, the challenged governmentaction was unlawful; indeed, it was unconstitutional.   The court needed special, unusual reasoningto explain why it declined to enforce a legal constraint on the defendant’s actions.32    Morgan demonstrates the error of the view, taken by some scholars, that when a courtdismisses a challenge to governmental action on the basis of the political question doctrine it isalways, necessarily holding “that there are no legal rules constraining the validity of [the] challengedaction.”33  Sometimes, as Morgan shows, the action is subject to legal constraint.  Similarly, it is not
Professor McCormack equates “legal constraints” with “judicially-enforceable constraints,” see 70 U. D et. Mercy L. Rev.at 822 (“[I]f a court is not willing to enforce a provision or principle, then that provision or principle is not law.”), butMorgan illustrates the difference between them.  The law— specifically,  the law set forth in the Constitution—requiresa house of Congress deciding a disputed congressional election to seat the winner, but the D.C. Circuit determined thatlaw to be judicially unenforceable.
34 Louis Seid man, This Essay is Brilliant / This Essay is Stupid:  Positive an d Nega tive Self-Re ference inConstitutional Practice and Theory , 46 UCLA L. Rev. 501, 529 n.60 (1998).  In fairness, Professor Seidman may bereferring only to the political question doctrine “in the form used in Nixon v. United States[, 506 U .S. 224 (1993)],”which could be  construed  as a bogus p olitical question  doctrine ca se.  See id .  But if the sentence quoted in the text aboveis meant to be  unqualified, Morgan shows it to  be inco rrect.
35 506 U.S. 224.
36 See U.S. Co nst., art. I § 3, cl. 6; 5 06 U.S . at 226-28 . - 13 -
correct to say that “the political question doctrine applies only in cases in which, on the merits, thegovernment action was constitutionally permissible in any event.”34  It is true that the politicalquestion doctrine is often, uselessly, invoked in such cases.  Courts also, however, invoke thedoctrine in cases in which it really does something:  it prevents the courts from enforcing, in whatwould otherwise be a proper Article III case, an actual legal constraint on government conduct.The Supreme Court’s latest major political question doctrine case, Nixon v. United States,35is somewhat frustrating in that it fails to take a clear position as to whether it invokes the real orbogus political question doctrine.  The case concerned the claim by impeached federal judge WalterNixon that the Senate violated its constitutional obligation to “try” his impeachment when it assignedthe actual taking of evidence to a Senate committee.36  The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal ofNixon’s complaint on the basis of the political question doctrine.Some of the statements in the Court’s opinion suggest that the Court was invoking the realpolitical question doctrine; that is, it held that the constitutional constraints imposed by therequirement that the Senate “try” impeachments are not judicially enforceable.  The Court noted that
37 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 6; 506 U.S. at 230-231.
38 506 U.S. at 231 (quoting Web ster’s Third New International Dictionary 2168 (1971)).
39 Id. at 234-35.
40 Id. at 236.
41 506 U.S. at 230.
42 The Senators m ust be on oath, a two-thirds vote is required for conviction, and, when the President is tried,the Chief Justice presides.  U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 6; 506 U.S. at 230.- 14 -
the Constitution gives the Senate the “sole” power to try impeachments;37 the Court held that theword “sole” has “considerable significance” and indicates that the Senate is to act “‘independentlyand without assistance or interference.’”38  The Court reasoned that impeachment could not properlyserve as a check on the judiciary if judges could review and nullify impeachment trials.39  The Courtalso determined that the difficulties in granting relief (difficulties that would be particularly severefollowing impeachment and conviction of the President) counseled against justiciability.40  All ofthese arguments suggested that the Court was holding that, even if the Constitution constrains theprocedures that the Senate may use to “try” an impeachment, no court can enforce those constraints.On the other hand, other statements in the Court’s opinion suggest that the Court held thatthe constitutional provision that the Senate shall “try” impeachments simply does not impose anyconstraints on the procedures that the Senate may use in an impeachment trial.  The Court lookedat dictionary definitions of the word “try” and concluded that “we cannot say that the Framers usedthe word ‘try’ as an implied limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in tryingimpeachments.”41 It also noted the three specific, constitutionally-imposed constraints onimpeachment trial procedure42 and concluded that their precise “nature suggests that the Framers didnot intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the
43 506 U.S. at 230.
44 Some scholars interpret the Nixon case just this way.  See, e.g., Seidman , supra  note ___, at 529.
45 One final possibility is worth noting:  perhaps the Court was saying that the word “try” might imposelimitations on the procedures that the Senate may use in trying an impeachment, but that it would be inappropriate forthe Court to d ecide the q uestion one  way or the oth er, because  the legal constr aints impose d by the wo rd, if there are any,are not judicially enforceable.  If that is what the Court is saying, I would characterize the case as a real political questioncase.  Such a disposition would leave open the possibility that the Court is declining to enforce actual legal co nstraintson government action, which would distinguish the case from a bogus political question case, in which a court dismissesbecause the challenged government action is simply not subject to any legal constraints (or at least, any that the p laintiffhas invoked). - 15 -
word ‘try.’”43  These statements suggest the possibility that Nixon is a bogus political question casethat really just held that the plaintiff’s claim was meritless.44  Indeed, it is hard to see what businessthe Court would have had even investigating the meaning of the word “try” to the extent that it didif, as is suggested by the Court’s other language, the selection of impeachment trial procedures is apolitical question wholly committed to the Senate for resolution.  Thus, while it is possible thatNixon demonstrates the continued viability of the real political question doctrine, the case may alsobe a mere bogus political question case.45C.  The Importance of the DistinctionThe foregoing discussion shows that the phrase “political question doctrine” covers twoentirely different situations:  in one, it is no more than a needlessly complicated way to say that anyplaintiff must lose who does not state some reason why a defendant’s challenged actions areunlawful; in the other, it states that courts must sometimes stay their hand even when the defendant’sactions are unlawful.  Two such different situations should have different names.  Using the samename for both can only cause confusion.  Even worse, applying the same doctrine to both situations must confound attempts to decidewhether we should have a political question doctrine or not.  If some people understand the doctrine
- 16 -
to mean that courts ought to dismiss cases in which plaintiffs challenge government actions that arenot subject to legal constraint, then discussion of the doctrine is hopeless.  Who could be againstthat?  Of course a court should dismiss a case in which the plaintiff challenges the President’sdecision to veto a bill as misguided or claims that the government must run the economy for thebenefit of farmers.  There’s nothing to discuss.  Moreover, arguments supporting dismissals in such bogus political question doctrine casesmay be perfectly valid (since such cases should certainly be dismissed), yet have no application toreal political question doctrine cases, because of the very different circumstances that such casespresent.  And yet, because the same name is used for both, one might easily be confused intothinking that an argument that supports dismissal in bogus political question cases shows that thereal political question doctrine should be preserved.  When this happens, the bogus political questiondoctrine becomes more than a complicated but harmless affectation; it is pernicious.The political question doctrine should, therefore, be banished from cases where it does nowork.  It should be reserved for cases in which the challenged government action is, or at least mightbe, subject to a legal constraint on which the plaintiff relies, but in which a court believes that itcannot enforce the constraint.  As to that conclusion, the court might be right or wrong, but at leastthere is an issue to discuss.II.  THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESSOnce it is understood that the real political question doctrine forecloses courts from enforcingactual legal constraints on government behavior, the doctrine raises an obvious and pressingquestion:  how will those constraints get enforced, if at all?  The very essence of our Constitution
46 Courts sometimes apply the political question doctrine to nonconstitutional constraints on governmentbehavior, e.g., Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim under the Hostag e Act,22 U.S.C. § 1 732, presented a  nonjusticiable political question), but this essay focuses on co nstitutional constraints.
47 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176  (1803).
48 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 3 (1962 ).
49 E.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST ITUTIONA L LAW 367 (3d ed. 2000); Larry D. Kramer , The SupremeCourt, 2000  Term, Forew ord:  We the C ourt, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2001).
50 Bickel, supra  note ___, at 3. - 17 -
is usually thought to lie in the constraints that it imposes.46  As Chief Justice Marshall observed inMarbury v. Madison, “[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitationcommitted to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to berestrained?”47  Alexander Bickel pointed out that Marshall’s argument does not immediately provethat the Constitution’s constraints must be judicially enforceable,48 but still, the Constitution’sconstraints on the political branches are supposed to be real constraints, not mere hortatoryadmonitions.  Under the American doctrine of judicial review, the normal enforcement mechanismfor these constraints is for courts to treat the Constitution as law that courts may enforce in cases thatcome before them.49  The political question doctrine’s departure from this normal pattern isimmediately troubling and demands a justification.This essay focuses on one argument that courts sometimes use in addressing this difficulty.Courts sometimes suggest that the political question doctrine does not destroy the requisiteenforceability of constitutional constraints, because the Constitution can still be enforced, as Bickelput it, “ultimately and finally [by] the people through the electoral process.”50  That is, if politicalactors should violate legal constraints on their behavior, the people are not without a remedy, evenif the political question doctrine blocks a judicial remedy.  The people can always vote the offending
51 418 U.S. 166 (1974).  The Statement and Account Clause provides that “a regular Statement and Accountof the Receip ts and Exp enditures of a ll public M oney shall  be publishe d from time  to time.”  U.S . Const, art. I, § 9 , cl.7.  Richardson, a U.S. taxpayer, asserted that Congress had violated the clause by pro viding that expenditures of theCentral Intelligence Agency need not be published.  The Supreme Court ordered the case dismissed.
52 Id. at 418 (q uoted infra).  But see Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(reaching merits of constitutionality of statute exempting CIA’s budget from publication where the p laintiff had soughtthe budget under the Freedom of Information Act).
53  Mark T ushnet,  Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:  The Transformation and Disappearance ofthe Political Question Doctrine, 80 N. Car. L. Rev 1203, 1214 (20 02).- 18 -
politicians out of office.The Supreme Court articulated this view most clearly in United States v. Richardson, inwhich it declined to consider the plaintiff’s claim that the Statement and Account Clause of theConstitution required the publication of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency.51  Althoughthe Court based its dismissal on its determination that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, the caseis appropriately considered here because the Court’s decision was so broad as to suggest strongly thatno one could ever have standing to seek enforcement of the Statement and Account Clause.52  AsProfessor Tushnet has observed, such a decision “blur[s] the lines between standing law and thepolitical question doctrine” and “comes very close to asserting that the question presented was apolitical one.”53  In justifying its decision that the Statement and Account Clause would effectively beinsusceptible of judicial enforcement, the Court expressly suggested that the plaintiff, althoughdebarred from suit, might use the electoral process to remedy what he perceived as a constitutionalviolation:It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one cando so.  In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigatethese claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to thesurveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. * * *  TheConstitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly
54 418 U.S. at 179.
55 Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edward s, J., dissenting in part and concurringin the judgm ent), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
56 Id. at 246.  The co urt  also rema rked that “[i]t do es not help e stablish justiciab ility to pose hypotheticals ofoutrageous behavior by a coord inate branc h.” Id.  It is, of course, som ewhat difficult to im agine that the S enate wou ldblatantly ignore the two -thirds voting req uirement for im peachme nt procee dings.  It is not, how ever, impo ssible toimagine that nontrivial qu estions might ar ise in the require ment’s applic ation.  What if, of 100 Senators present for animpeachment vote, 66 vote “guilty,” 33 vote “not guilty,” and one votes “present” or declines to vote?  The constitutionaltext would seem pretty clearly to preclude a conviction (“no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of the memb ers present,”  U.S. Co nst., art. I, § 3, cl. 6), but it is not impossible to imagine that the presiding officerwould  rule that a vote of 66 “guilty” and 33 “not guilty” is a two-thirds vote to convict.  A question might also arise froma Senator’s unconventional vote, such as Senator Arlen Specter’s vote of “not proven, therefore not guilty” on theimpeachment of President Clinton.  See Peter Baker an d Helen D ewar, Clinton A cquitted; 2  Impea chmen t Articles Fa ilto Win Sen ate Ma jority; Five R epublica ns Join D emocra ts In Voting Down Both Charges , Washington Post, Feb. 13,1999, a t A1.  - 19 -
responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that theConstitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disablethe citizen who is not satisfied with the ‘ground rules’ established by the Congressfor reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch.  Lack of standing within thenarrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his viewsin the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive thoughthe traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides forchanging members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince asufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquentin performing duties committed to them.54Other courts have echoed this suggestion that the electoral process provides the appropriateenforcement mechanism for legal constraints that cannot be judicially enforced and have applied itspecifically to political question doctrine cases.  The D.C. Circuit, for example, invoked thisargument in its opinion in the Walter Nixon impeachment case.  Judge Edwards, in his dissentingopinion, argued that if impeachments pose nonjusticiable political questions, then the Senate mightadopt a rule allowing it to convict and remove impeached officers by a mere majority vote.55  Thecourt replied that “if the senators try to ignore the clear requirement of a two-thirds vote forconviction, they will have to contend with public outrage that will ultimately impose its sanction atthe ballot box.”56    Similarly, in affirming dismissal of the election challenge in Morgan v. United
The D.C. Circuit left open the possibility that a claim that the Senate violated the two-thirds requirement wouldbe justiciable.  938 F .2d at 246 n.2. Some language in the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that it too left thatpossibility op en, but other  language in the  opinion sug gests that the political question doctrine would foreclose such aclaim.  As discussed earlier, some passages in the Supreme  Court’s Nixon opinion co ntrast the clarity of the  three specificconstitutional requirements for impeachment trials with the open-ended nature of the word “try”; these passages hint thata claim that the Senate violated the specific requirements might be justiciable.  Other parts of the opinion makearguments  that are independent of the nature of the alleged defect in an impeachment trial (such as that judicial reviewwould  prevent impeachment from serving as a check on the judicial branch, that there is a compelling need for finalityin impeachment cases, and that it would be difficult to fashion relief); these parts suggest that the courts could neverreview any judgm ent of convic tion in an impeachment case, even if the Senate violated a clear rule such as the two-thirdsrequireme nt.
57 Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 450 (D .C. Cir. 1986).
58 263 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2001). For mo re similar statements in political question doctrine cases, see,e.g., Smith v. Rea gan, 844  F.2d 19 5, 200 (4 th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim under the Hostage Act, 22 U.S.C.§ 1732, presented a nonjusticiable political question; “[a]ccountab ility lies in oversight by Congress or in criticism fromthe electorate, b ut not in the judgments of the courts.”); Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186 (7 th Cir. 1984) (also holding thatclaims under the Hostage Act present nonjusticiable political questions; “the failure of the President to take any actionafter a finding of a wrongful detention is made is no t remediable by the courts, nor, pe rhaps, even Co ngress, but so lelyby the electorate ”).  For similar sta tements  not actually  involving the political question doctrine, see Troxel v. Granville,530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the commitmentto representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoralcampaigns,  that the State has no power to interfere with parents’ authority over the rearing of their children, I do notbelieve that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge e ntitles me to de ny legal effect to law s that (inmy view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.”); Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 1006 (4 th Cir.1990) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“[If the defendant] overstepped the boundary of sound judgment, he should be calledto account, not under § 1983, but at the ballot box.”).
59 Rachel B arkow, More S uprem e than C ourt?  Th e Fall of the  Political Q uestion D octrine and  the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 327 (2002 ).- 20 -
States, the D.C. Circuit noted that “a substantial degree of responsibility is still provided by regularelections, [and] the interim demands of public opinion.”57  Likewise, the Seventh Circuit, affirmingdismissal in Schroder v. Bush  (discussed above), approvingly quoted the district court’s remark that“[p]laintiffs’ remedies are at the polling place, not the courts.”58  Scholars too have invoked this argument in defense of the political question doctrine.  RachelBarkow, for example, asks, “are there not some constitutional questions that should be answered bythe political branches precisely because these branches are accountable to the people?”59  She notesstatements from the Framing era suggesting that “[i]f the Congress makes laws inconsistent with the
60 Id. (quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates at 168; 4 Elliot’s Debates at 71).
61 Id. at 297.
62 See Kramer , supra  note ___, at 26-27, 72-73.
63 See, e.g., Schroder, 263 F.3 d at 117 1-76; Morgan , at 801 F.2d at 447-50.
64 Barkow , supra  note ___, at 300-35. - 21 -
Constitution . . . [a] universal resistance will ensue,” and that “[t]he ability to vote a member [ofCongress] or the President out of office ‘will prove a security to [the people’s] liberties, and a mostimportant check to the power of the general government.’”60  By contrast, she notes, becauseSupreme Court Justices hold office for life, “the people cannot express their discontent orsatisfaction at the ballot box” when the Court improperly asserts control over what ought to be apolitical decision.61   Indeed, Larry Kramer, similarly relying on historical materials, suggests thatthe Constitution’s Framers conceived of popular measures, most particularly elections, and notjudicial review, as the primary enforcement mechanism for the entire Constitution.62Reliance on the electoral process forms but a small part of arguments made in defense of thepolitical question doctrine.  Courts typically use the argument as a mere fillip, with the main analysisgoing to the Baker v. Carr factors.63  Professor Barkow, too, had many other more importantarguments to offer.64  Still, it is worth examining this argument in detail and seeing exactly what iswrong with it, because its refutation provides useful insights. A.  The Electoral Process as a Substitute for Judicial Remedies The argument noted above suggests that the electoral process may provide an appropriatesubstitute for a judicial remedy.  This suggestion cannot, however, be sustained.  It ignores a hostof problems that must inevitably arise in attempts to use the electoral process to enforce legal
65 Richardson, 418 U .S. at 179. - 22 -
constraints on political behavior.  Examination of these problems reminds us of the fundamentaldifferences between political and judicial remedies—differences that go to the heart of our systemof judicial review.To begin with, the suggestion that citizens should use the electoral process to redressnonjusticiable constitutional grievances will often be entirely impractical.  Perhaps Mr. Richardson,after being turned away by the judicial system, could stir up some political interest in the questionof whether the United States should publish the CIA’s budget, but the notion that he could use thisissue to turn the President or Members of Congress out of office is plainly untenable.  The issue issimply not of sufficient importance; no substantial number of voters could ever be expected to casttheir votes based on it.  It would be equally difficult—even for one who agreed with the merits ofhis constitutional claim—to imagine former Judge Nixon’s “convinc[ing] a sufficient number of[his] fellow electors that elected representatives [were] delinquent”65 in failing to try hisimpeachment before the full Senate.  As these cases show, violations of the Constitution may involverather obscure issues that would not likely have much, if any, resonance in actual election campaigns.Nor would the case necessarily be different for truly important issues.  Even in the case ofthe most momentous constitutional violations, there may be no practical way to use a politician’sunconstitutional actions to engineer his or her subsequent electoral defeat.  Few constitutional claimscould be more serious than the claim that the 2000 presidential election was stolen, but voters whobelieve that it was may have little chance of putting the issue to work electorally.  Professor Barkow,in criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision to resolve the Bush v. Gore case, argues that the ArticleII questions involved in the case may have been political questions that the Court should have left
66 Barkow , supra  note __, at 300.  Professor Barkow does not quite conclude that the que stions were politicalquestions; she states that “the Article  II question in the Bush  cases presented a strong candidate for application of thepolitical question doctrine.”  Id.
67 Id. at 297. - 23 -
for Congress to resolve,66 and she observes that the Court, by taking the decision away from thepolitical process, left the people with no way to “express their discontent or satisfaction at the ballotbox.”67  Suppose, however, that the Court had held the dispute nonjusticiable and left it forcongressional resolution; would voters have used the ballot box to “express their discontent orsatisfaction”?  The earliest opportunity to do so was two years away, and the election dispute,momentous as it was, was subsequently drowned out by the even more momentous terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001.  Even if Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, had resolved the 2000election controversy, there seems little reason to believe that voters would have had any practicalway to turn the 2002 or 2004 elections into a referendum on the validity of Congress’s decision.This impracticality of using the electoral process to air constitutional grievances is a symptomof several vital differences between the judicial and political processes.  Some such differences arevery practical in nature:  for example, attempting to use the electoral process to redress aconstitutional grievance would obviously require a tremendous investment of time, effort, andresources, probably orders of magnitude beyond the investment necessary for litigation.  There arealso, however, more theoretically significant differences that emphasize the unsuitability of theelectoral process for the resolution of legal grievances no matter what resources might be put intothe effort.First, the judicial process is focused.  A plaintiff comes to court with a specific claim of right,and the judicial process provides a proceeding for the resolution of that specific claim.  By contrast,
68 Donald Doernberg makes this point in his comments on United States v. Richardson.   See Donald L.Doernb erg, “We the People”:  John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge GovernmentAction, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 52, 99 (1985) (“[T]he political process . . . is particularly unresponsive to single-issuecandidacies,  especially at the national level.  The more diverse the electorate and the more complicated the issue facingit, the less any single issue  is likely to be disp ositive in the electo ral proces s.”). - 24 -
the electoral process is never focused on just one issue.  Congressional and presidential elections arenot referendums.  Each candidate always embodies a package of positions on the numerous issuesfacing the electorate at any given time, plus general qualities such as trustworthiness, experience,skill, and charm.  For this reason, even if voters wanted to use an election to express their views onalleged constitutional violations, the process of voting would not give them a clear opportunity todo so.  Voters cannot vote on discrete issues; they can vote only on the whole package that acandidate represents.68Indeed, what if two groups of voters were simultaneously attempting to use an election toremedy two different alleged constitutional violations, each of which had been held to involve anonjusticiable political question?  Each candidate for a given office might regard one of the allegedviolations as a real violation that Congress should rectify, but the other as constitutionallypermissible government behavior.  If the candidates had conflicting views as to which allegedviolation was really a problem, voters might be able to express their dissatisfaction with one of thealleged violations only by ostensibly expressing approval for the other.  Again, the upshot is thatelection campaigns do not present a genuine opportunity for voters to resolve legal issues.Moreover, even if a voter’s attempt to remedy constitutional violations through the electoralprocess were somehow successful, the legal situation would not be much different.  The unfocusednature of elections points to another problem that must plague even successful efforts to rightconstitutional violations through the ballot box:  the electoral process is inscrutable.  Let us imagine
69 In articulating the fa ctors that con stitute elements o f a fair hearing, Jud ge Friendly  remarked  that he wouldput the requirement of a statement of reasons for the result “close to  the top rather  than near the b ottom of the s cale.”Henry J. F riendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1292 (19 75).
70 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, J r., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 371 (1993) (“D ue process doctrine assumes that there is less of a systemic interestin ensuring correct fact-finding than in achieving judicial articulation and enforcement of generally applicableconstitutional norms.”). - 25 -
that a would-be plaintiff, finding her lawsuit blocked by the political question doctrine, attempts tomake the alleged unconstitutionality of government action an issue in a subsequent election; morethan that, let us imagine that, against all odds, she is successful!  Her issue captures electoralattention, and the incumbent she attacks, who had brought about the allegedly unconstitutionalaction, is defeated at the polls.  Now what? The problem is that one can never really know why the incumbent was defeated.  Even afterthe bum is duly thrown out, one is left to read electoral tea leaves and watch pundits opine on the“meaning” of the election.  Perhaps the electorate voted the losing candidate out of office becauseof its anger at his allegedly unconstitutional actions, but, on the other hand, perhaps not.  Perhapsthe election was really about economic conditions, or national defense, or the challenger’s personalcharm, or a scandal afflicting the incumbent’s political party, or any of a hundred other possibilities.This hypothetical illustrates another critical difference between the electoral and the judicialprocess.  A fundamental attribute of judicial decisions is that they come with a statement ofreasons.69  One knows not only who wins, but why; the process not only yields a result, but articulatesa norm.70  By contrast, even in the event that someone successfully used the electoral process to aira constitutional grievance, we could never really know it.  The electoral process yields only a result.It does not tell us what caused that result, and usually there are so many contributing factors that itwould be impossible to say that the election had decided a constitutional question.  The electoral
- 26 -
process does not articulate norms.Closely related to this point is the further problem that the electoral process does not operatewithin a system of precedent.  This problem follows, in part, from the last one:  because electionsare inscrutable and have no ascertainable meaning, they cannot set binding precedents for subsequentelections.  Even if voters wanted to adhere to decisions on constitutional issues made via elections,and somehow agreed to do so, there would be no ascertainable decisions for voters to follow.Moreover, of course, voters have no such agreement.  Each election presents a new set ofcandidates and issues.  Even assuming that, somehow, voters managed to turn some Members ofCongress out of office for their perceived constitutional misbehavior, nothing guarantees a similarresult the next time the issue arises.  Political actors may, of course, be chastened by experience—noPresident, for example, has repeated President Franklin Roosevelt’s ill-fated attempt to pack theSupreme Court by adding additional Justices—but, with regard to constitutional provisions that arenot susceptible of judicial enforcement, the political branches could repeat behavior even if, in thepast, it had stirred up voter anger.  A new electorate would have to decide what to do.For this reason, elections are not capable of finally resolving constitutional questions andproviding long-term redress for constitutional grievances in a fashion comparable to the judicialprocess.  Of course, one might point out that, because courts may overrule past decisions, the judicialprocess never absolutely resolves constitutional questions either.  Still, the role of precedent isobviously quite different in the two processes.  A President or a Member of Congress contemplatingaction of a kind that the courts have held to be unconstitutional will have a quite strong expectationthat the action will be unsuccessful.  With regard to actions raising nonjusticiable constitutionalquestions that in the past led to electoral defeat (even assuming one could accurately identify the
71 Actually, there a re numero us impedim ents to the imple mentation o f majoritarian ism in the electoral process,such as the electora l college system  in presidentia l elections, the disp roportio nate ability of wealthy voters to persuadetheir fellow citizens, and the possibility of a victory, in a three-way congressional or presidential race, of a candidate whowould  be the last choice for a majority of voters.  But the point here is that the electoral process is predominantlymajoritarian, unlike the judicial process.
72 See Bickel,  supra  note ___, at 25 (“when the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotionsride high enough, men will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view”).
73 See Mulhern , supra  note ___, at 153 n. 202.
74 Marb ury v. Ma dison, 5 U .S. 137, 1 76 (18 03); Do ernberg, supra  note ___, at 99-100; Dana S. Treister,Standing to Sue the  Govern ment:  A re Sepa ration of P owers Pr inciples Re ally Being Served, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 689,715 (1994). - 27 -
causes of past electoral defeats), a politician may sense that the temper of the electorate has changedand that comparable action might not be electorally punished.Finally, the electoral process is of course majoritarian:  the electorate will pick the candidatethat a majority of voters like best.71   This is a virtue from the standpoint of democracy, but withregard to attempts to use the process to redress constitutional grievances, it poses a problem:  themajority might like a candidate best precisely because of the candidate’s willingness to ignoreconstitutional constraints on majoritarianism.  A likely reason for politicians to violate constitutionalnorms in the first place is that they sense some political advantage in doing so.72  Thus, while acharge of constitutional violation might have some “debate value” that could be used in the electoralprocess,73 that debate value could be overwhelmed by the political popularity of the constitutionalviolation. Moreover, whether or not a particular constitutional violation is in fact politically popular,the whole purpose of putting constraints into the Constitution was to put certain matters beyondmajoritarian, political control.74  The judicial process provides a forum to which plaintiffs can comewith a claim of right that is independent of majority support.  To require plaintiffs to resort to the
75 263 F.3d at 1171 (quoting district court’s opinion).- 28 -
political process is to require them to win current majoritarian support for a point that, if valid,should be conclusive whether it has such support or not.This point, incidentally, demonstrates once again the vital importance of maintaining a cleardistinction between real political question doctrine cases and bogus political question doctrine cases.The argument that plaintiffs should seek their remedy at the ballot box is, in fact, perfectlyappropriate for the latter.  Where government action is not subject to legal constraint (the hallmarkof a bogus political question case), pure political struggle among competing forces legitimatelydetermines the government’s choice of action.  The Constitution provides no answer to innumerablevital questions about the structure of our society, such as whether taxes should be high or low,whether the government should help farmers or let them battle market forces unaided, or whetherthe President should sign or veto any given bill.  A plaintiff who goes to court over such a questionis quite properly told to turn to the political process instead of the judicial one.  The court is simplysaying that the question presented is one that our legal system entrusts to unconstrained majoritariandecision.  Thus, for example, the Tenth Circuit’s comment that the farmer plaintiffs in Schroder v.Bush should seek relief “at the polling place, not the courts”75 was exactly correct.The appropriateness of such an argument in bogus political doctrine cases may, however,have the unfortunate consequence of causing courts to use the same argument in real politicalquestion doctrine cases, which present entirely different circumstances.  The essence of a realpolitical question case is that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce an actual legal constraint ongovernment action.  A court telling the plaintiff that his remedy lies “at the ballot box” is saying thatplaintiff must attempt to use the electoral process to enforce a legal constraint on that very process.
76 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
77 Bickel, supra  note ___, at 23-28. - 29 -
The result is that plaintiffs are entitled to enforce constitutional constraints on political actions onlyif they can “convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives aredelinquent,”76 but the representatives may have taken the actions precisely because they were likelyto win votes despite their violation of constitutional norms.  Usually, we think of constitutionalconstraints as existing for the very purpose of reining in the political process in cases where short-term political expediency might cause government officials to take actions that deviate from ourconstitutional values.77The use of the “political question” label for these two very different situations is thereforedoubly unfortunate.  It does more than simply lead to the application of an unnecessary layer ofdoctrine in those bogus political question cases that could be dismissed for failure to state a claim.It creates an inappropriate line of thinking that may spill over into the real political question cases.Courts accustomed to telling plaintiffs—rightly—they should be organizing electorally rather thanlitigating bogus political question cases may erroneously apply this same point in cases concerninglegal constraints designed to protect plaintiffs from the results of the electoral process.In any event, for all of the reasons stated above, the suggestion that voters might use theelectoral process to remedy nonjusticiable constitutional grievances is inappropriate.  The suggestionwill often be entirely impractical,  the electoral process provides no focused mechanism for raisinglegal questions, it leads to an inscrutable result, and, even if it is successful, it may need to be foughtafresh every election cycle.  Possibly worst of all, the majoritarian election process provides a poormechanism for the enforcement of restraints on majoritarianism.
78 See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179  (referring to the plaintiff’s right to assert his views “in the politicalforum or at the polls”) (emphasis added). - 30 -
B.  The Political Process as a Substitute for Judicial RemediesPerhaps, one might argue, the suggestions that voters may use the electoral process to remedynonjusticiable constitutional grievances should not be taken quite so literally.  Although courts haveexpressly referred to the remedy of “the ballot box” and the possibility of turning politicians out ofoffice because of unconstitutional (but not judicially remediable) misbehavior, perhaps what courtsreally meant was that voters could attempt to obtain redress using the political process moregenerally, not specifically the electoral process.78  Voters could simply agitate for change throughlegislation.  Politicians might want to keep special-interest voters happy in the legislative processwithout testing their ultimate electoral strength.Moreover, one might argue that the legislative process avoids some of the problemsassociated with the electoral process that were discussed above.  In particular, the legislative processcan be more focused and less inscrutable than the electoral process.  Particular issues, such aswhether the CIA’s budget should be published, can be brought to a clean, up-or-down vote.  Theyneed not always be entangled with other issues, as is inevitable in elections, and a particularlegislative vote may provide a clear indication of the political judgment as to the constitutionalityof the measure involved.However, while the legislative process is different from the electoral process, it shares mostof the problems noted above for the electoral process and adds at least one additional, very importantproblem not found in the judicial or electoral process.  The electoral process, for all of its difficulties,is mandatory; elections are held at required intervals.  The judicial process, too, has the vital
79  Cohens v. V irginia, 19 U .S. 264, 4 04 (182 1). 
80 Of course, one aspe ct of the political question doctrine is that, at least accordin g to some, it afford s courtsdiscretion to decline to  grant a reme dy when they re gard do ing so as inexp edient.   Moreover, as Henkin observed, courtsmay consid er the dem ands of eq uity in deciding whether to grant certain forms of relief.  But the point here is that thejudiciary does not have, as the legislature do es, a general discretion to do no thing in response to petitions for redress.
81 Cf. Krame r, supra note ___ , at 27 (noting that American colonists first challenged the Stamp Act bypetitioning Parliament, but Parliament ignored the petitions and failed even to consider them).- 31 -
characteristic that plaintiffs can invoke it as of right.  As Chief Justice Marshall remarked in Cohensv. Virginia, “[t]he judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approachesthe confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful.”79  The judiciary isobliged to give relief to a plaintiff who is entitled to it.80There is, however, no guaranteed way to invoke the legislative process.  Citizens can alwaysask for legislation, but there is no way to compel Congress to bring any matter to a vote.  A courtfaced with a claim (in a properly posed case) that a statute is unconstitutional has a duty to rule onthe claim—perhaps rejecting it, of course, but not ignoring it altogether.  A legislature faced witha claim that it should change an existing statute because it is unconstitutional may choose to ignorethe issue indefinitely.81  Those making the claim would then be thrown back on the electoral process,with all of its attendant difficulties.Moreover, the legislative process also, like the electoral process, lacks a system of precedent:what one Congress does, the next may undo.  In addition, the legislative process, although capableof stating reasons for its actions, is not required to do so; Congress may pass a law with or withoutadopting official findings and purposes, and the legislature’s rejection of a law certainly does notnecessarily imply a judgment as to its constitutional validity.  Similarly, the legislative process mayprovide a clean up-or-down vote on a particular issue, but frequently it entangles many issues
82 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine  of Standing a s an Essential Elem ent of the Separa tion of Powers , 17 SuffolkUniv. L. Rev. 881, 895 (1983).
83 Id. at 896-97.
84 Judge N ixon’s allegedly flawed remo val, for examp le, was not a wid ely-shared inju ry.  (Justice Sca lia, itshould  be noted, made the argument with regard to standing doctrine, not the political question doctrine; the argumentis invoked h ere only in an e ffort to see if it could  support th e suggestion that the electoral process may serve a s asubstitute for the ju dicial proc ess in political q uestion case s.)- 32 -
together in a single bill, thus denying clear opportunities for resolution of particularized questionsof constitutionality.  And the legislative process, like the electoral process, is majoritarian in natureand can hardly be expected to serve as a good enforcement mechanism for those constitutionalprovisions that are intended to restrain majoritarianism.One might argue—in fact, Justice Scalia has argued—that justiciability doctrines serve todistinguish those constitutional provisions that restrain majoritarianism by giving individuals rightsagainst the majority from those constitutional provisions that grant rights to the people as a whole,to be exercised by a majority of the people.  Justice Scalia (when a D.C. Circuit judge) argued thatthe doctrine of standing, with its rule against the litigation of generalized grievances, “is an essentialmeans of restricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority rather than majorityinterests”82  Where the majority, expressing its will through the political process, chooses to allowgovernment behavior that involves no harm to individual interests, courts should, Justice Scaliaclaims, ignore any legal constraints that may be violated; indeed, the majority’s ability to choose toallow certain legal constraints to fall into desuetude is, he argues, one of the majoritarian process’suseful features.83 Of course, there is no guarantee that political questions will involve the kind of widely-sharedinjuries to which Justice Scalia’s argument is appropriate.84  But even where they do, the argument
85 Scalia, supra  note ___, at 896. - 33 -
still suffers from the same problem that was pointed out above with regard to the electoral process.The Constitution places certain things beyond majoritarian control; to suggest that the majority maychoose when to obey constitutional constraints and when to ignore them drains those constraints oftheir basic purpose.  The best interpretation of the Statement and Account Clause may or may notrequire the government to publish the CIA’s budget, but it is a little hard to fathom what purpose theclause serves if it means no more than “publish that part of the budget which the Congress, actingthrough the normal political process, decides ought to be published.”  No constitutional provisionis needed to tell Congress that it may publish such part of the budget as it likes; that is the defaultstarting point under Congress’s ordinary powers.  Justice Scalia’s argument turns certainconstitutional constraints (the ones that, according to him, protect majority interests rather thanindividual interests)  into admonitions that not only are merely hortatory, but also are pointless, inthat, in his view, they do no more than redundantly confirm the majority’s ability to do what it likes.Moreover, the legislative process imposes numerous impediments to the ability of even amajority to work its will.  The bicameral division of the legislature, the committee structure and theattendant power given to selected Members of Congress, the possibility of filibusters in the Senate,the ever-present press of business, and other obstacles to the passage of legislation considerablyweaken the strength of the inference that if a statute that violates a constitutional provision remainson the books, the people must approve of it.  Justice Scalia suggests that widely shared injuries(generalized grievances of the Richardson type) should be left to the political process for resolutionbecause “[t]here is surely no reason to believe that [such injuries] would not receive fairconsideration in the normal political process,”85 but the obstacles imposed by the political process
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may thwart the ability of even a majority to obtain something the Constitution was supposed toguarantee for it.Thus, if by steering plaintiffs with nonjusticiable complaints to the electoral process, courtsreally meant the political process generally, including the legislative process, the result is not reallybetter than if they meant the electoral process specifically.  The general political process providesno mandatory way to raise issues; it does not operate within a system of precedent; its majoritariannature suggests that, like the electoral process, it will not do a good job of enforcing constraints onmajoritarianism; and the obstacles that the political process imposes mean that even a majority maynot be able to navigate it successfully.C.  Implications for the Political Question Doctrine For these reasons, the argument that voters can use the electoral process to remedyconstitutional violations should be banished from discussions of the political question doctrine.Even when used as a mere grace note to accompany more important arguments, it strikes adiscordant tone.  It represents an unfair appeal to our democratic instincts.  Seeing the argument flashby in the brief form in which it is usually made, we are invited to think “ah,elections—voting—democracy—that must be good,” and to ignore the profound practical andtheoretical difficulties that would lie in the path of any attempt to put the point to actual use.  Thefundamental differences between the judicial and the electoral processes mean that the ability toresort to the electoral process is not an appropriate substitute for judicial relief for constitutionalviolations.Of course, this does not prove that the political question doctrine is wrong.  The main pointof this essay has merely been to refute one argument used in support of that doctrine.  It may still be
86 E.g., Barkow , supra  note ___, at 240, 301-02, 329.
87 Mulhern , supra  note ___, at 124-28.
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that our Constitution does not permit judicial review of certain claims, even though it provides noadequate substitute for such review.Still, thinking about what would actually happen if someone tried to use the electoral processto remedy a constitutional grievance perhaps provides an insight into the more general argumentsover the validity of the political question doctrine.  Defenders of the political question doctrine oftenfocus on characteristics of the judicial and political branches of government that impact thesuitability of the different branches for resolution of constitutional questions.  Scholars and courtsobserve that the political branches have an institutional advantage with regard to certain questions,such as those that require extensive factfinding or choices between competing policies.86  Thejudiciary, these defenders also note, has no monopoly on constitutional interpretation; theConstitution vests the President and Members of Congress with interpretive authority that makes thepolitical branches suitable to enforce constitutional norms.87The characteristic of the judiciary most prominently mentioned in these discussions is itspolitical insulation and independence—a characteristic that is said to make the judiciary theappropriate branch to enforce some constitutional constraints, but not others.88  Examination of thedifferences between the judicial and the electoral processes, however, brings out other, criticalcharacteristics of the judiciary that strongly impact its suitability for the enforcement ofconstitutional constraints.  These other characteristics—the mandatory nature of the judicial process,its focus on precisely stated issues, its articulation of reasons for decisions, and its use of
89 It is for this reason that defenders of the political question doctrine have a good point when they observe thatother restrictions on justiciability, such as the standing requirement, may prevent certain constitutional questions fromever coming b efore the jud iciary in a prop er Article  III case.  E.g., Mulhern , supra  note ___, at 119-21.  A full answerto this point would be too long for this short essay to contain, but the brief response is that there are problems with theseother justiciability doctrines as well. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to ProfessorBrilmaye r, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1698, 1706 (19 80) (arguing for a “barebones” approach to standing doctrine); HenryMona ghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  the Who and the When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363 (1973).- 36 -
precedent—all contribute to the way in which judicial review serves to enforce the Constitution.  These other characteristics of judicial review are vital to a system in which constitutionalconstraints on political action are real constraints and not mere hortatory admonitions.  Themandatory nature of the judicial process is obviously vital in that it creates a forum in whichconstitutional grievances can be aired and in which official decision makers must respond to them.89The focused nature of judicial review ensures that constitutional grievances are not lost because ofthe entanglement with other issues that would inevitably occur in the electoral, and might sometimesoccur in the political, processes.  The statement of reasons that accompanies judicial decisionsensures that the process articulates constitutional norms so that both the public and political actorscan know what constraints the Constitution imposes on government behavior.  The system ofprecedent ensures that once a constitutional norm is established, it will tend to remain established;while the force of precedent is of course not absolute, it does mean that constitutional victories oncewon do not have to be refought every election cycle.These characteristics of judicial review, and their absence from the electoral and politicalprocess, must be considered by defenders of the political question doctrine.  Defenders need toexplain why it is appropriate to entrust the enforcement of constitutional constraints on governmentbehavior to a process that not only, because of its majoritarian nature, seems a poor one for enforcingconstraints on majoritarianism, but that lacks certain characteristics that play an important role in
90 Bickel, supra  note ___, at 18.
91 Id. at 16.
92 Id. at 23-28. - 37 -
enforcing any constraints on government behavior, even constraints that might have majoritariansupport.  The political question doctrine cuts constitutional constraints off from the process bestdesigned to enforce constraints. CONCLUSIONIn justifying what he called the “deviant”90 and “counter-majoritarian”91 institution of judicialreview, Bickel suggested that the courts’ insulation from politics puts them in a good position toenforce enduring values when such values conflict with presently expedient measures adopted bypolitical actors.92   This feature of judicial review—the Constitution’s placement of most importantsocietal decisions in the hands of politically accountable actors, subject to review forconstitutionality by judges insulated by life tenure—is indeed the chief brilliance of ourconstitutional system.  But there is more to it than that.  Judicial review works not only because ofthe political insulation of judges, but because of the distinctive nature of the judicial process:because the judicial process is focused, because it is mandatory, because it articulates normsexplicitly, and because it operates within a system of precedent.  These special characteristics ofjudicial review, not found in the electoral or legislative processes, impose an additional burden ofexplanation on those who would defend the way the political question doctrine bars judicial reviewof constitutional issues.  They also demonstrate why defenders of the political question doctrineshould not suggest, even as a minor argument, that the electoral or legislative process provides anadequate substitute for judicial review.
